German Strategy and the Path to Verdun

This book was a very interesting examination of, what is typically taken to be a monolithic approach of the German Army and its total commitment to the concept of the decisive battle, and explores the other approaches that were developed and advocated by others both from within and from without the German Imperial Army.The author begins at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, more precisely the 2nd phase the Volkskrieg (People’s War). Helmuth von Moltke The Elder, the architect of the decisive battle victories in the Wars of Unification began to think that such military plans were par of history and Germany would need a new approach to war to win future conflicts. Others picked up this torch, notably Hans Delbruck (Scientist and Saint so sayeth Young Frankenstein 😊) and engaged in heated debates with the German military on the merits of the decisive battle strategy vs. the attrition strategy.The book then looks at the thinking of Schlieffen and makes some interesting observations about his thinking even going so far to (in my words) discuss how Molkte the Younger might be a better name for the Schlieffen Plan.From there the Great War is unleashed and Falkenhayn takes over as Chief of the General staff after the German defeat at the Marne. Falkenhayn embraces the idea the attrition war deciding Germany needs to win battles to wear down one of the Triple Entente members and force them to drop out of the war. It is very interesting who he sees as Germany’s primary enemy.The last half of the book describes the development of Falkenhayn’s strategy and its execution first in the east in the Gorlice campaign and then with Verdun. The clash of ideas between the Chief of the General staff and the members of the German 5th Army that executed the Verdun plan is very interesting and goes a long way to explaining the German defeat before this French fortress.This book was quite eye opening and, coupled with Zuber’s book The Real German Warplan 1904-14 gives a very different picture than the one traditionally associated with the German Army at the outbreak of the Great War. This book is well written, thoroughly cited, and to the point (the text is only 268 pages). Bottom Line: this book greatly increased my knowledge of German planning prior to WWI as well as giving me new perspectives on The Battle of Verdun. I highly recommend it.

This was an excellent review of German strategic thought leading up to the Great War, as well as subsequent development that led to Verdun. Controversy within the German General Staff that undermined Von Falkenhayn's intent is also well-covered, as are Von Falkenhayn's personality traits that led to his downfall. This is a strong addition to my library and expanded my understanding of WWI.

"German Strategy and the Path to Verdun", by Robert T. Foley is a book that examines the conflicts of strategy between General der Infanterie Erich von Falkenhayn and virtually the rest of the German High Command during the middle of World War I.The first two chapters of the book are taken up with discussions on lessons learned from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 and development of German strategy. While the early stages of that war resulted in several tremendous German victories that destroyed most of France's standing armies, France continued to fight on and the Germans found themselves engaged in more of a attritional war as the French raised more armies. Up until that point (with the exception, perhaps, of the American Civil War), most wars were settled by a few decisive victories that destroyed the standing army and led to the losing side suing for peace. However, the Franco-Prussian War seemed to point to a change where the future wars would be fought between whole nations, not merely the government in power and it's professional army. While the vast majority of German military thinkers continued to believe that decisive victories were still the way to win a war, a small but vocal minority of Germans believed that given Germany's limitations, a more attritional war of situational attacks and strategic defenses where Germany bled the other country's armies and demoralized them so that they would seek a negotiated peace was the way of the future. I'll be honest in that I believe these first two chapters, although very well researched, were very dry and much overdone, and this ground could have been amply covered in a just a few pages.However, beginning with chapter 3, which deals with Alfred von Schlieffen's creation and development of his overall strategic plan for victory in a possible future war against both the French and Russians, the pace and readability picks up tremendously. As most of you know, this plan was to basically quickly crush the French so that the Germans could then turn and deal with the Russians before they fully mobilized their armies. However, Schlieffen's plan was adopted in part because German leadership had no other good options, as they did not have the resources to sustain a long war against foes that both outnumbered them and had access to more material resources.The book continues with the start of World War I, and Schlieffen's plan, as implemented by his successor Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, failed. This left Germany in the position of having to develop a new strategy for victory, or at least to avoid defeat. After Moltke was cashiered in 1914 for failing to deliver victory, Erich von Falkenhayn was appointed in his place, a very surprising and unpopular choice as he was promoted over many generals his senior, and who did not have a network of supporters within the German military hierarchy. He did, however, have the support of Germany's emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, who though perhaps not as powerful a monarch as popularly thought, had the power to appoint and dismiss the Chief of the German General Staff.As the book describes, Falkenhayn came to believe, given the way the war was being waged, that decisive victories in the traditional sense were no longer possible. He also strongly felt that the decisive front was the western front facing France and England, not the Eastern Front against Russia. His strategic solution would be of limited, punishing attacks which expended artillery rather than blood, and strategic defenses that would bleed the enemy dry and drive them to seek negotiated peace. However, virtually the entire German military and political staff were opposed to these views and to the appointment of Falkenhayn, particularly the German commanders for the Eastern Front (Ober-Ost) Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, who were convinced that the western front should stand on the defensive, and that Germany should launch strategic offensives against the Russians that could knock them out of the war. Falkenhayn felt that Russia was too vast to be beaten directly and could perhaps be encouraged to drop out of the war. It's against this backdrop that Falkenhayn launched the German attack at Verdun, with the intent of forcing the French to fight at a politically and strategically important point and suffer so many casualties while trying to hold/retake it, that they would be forced to negotiate a peace favorable to Germany. Failing that, he believed that, after the British wore themselves out attacking the Germans on their front, Germany would then be in a position to launch offensives against her greatly weakened opponents and bring the war in the west to an end.The book is very well researched is both an entertaining read to the layman but is nuanced and detailed enough for the expert. It points out how Germans, limited in both resources and manpower, struggled to find a way to win the war before she and her allies became exhausted and had to surrender. The conflicts between Falkenhayn and the "easterners", led by Hindenburg and Ludendorff were really a struggle between opposing views of how to conduct a war, and since Falkenhayn was not able to deliver a strategic victory at Verdun, he was relieved of his position, and Hindenburg was promoted into his place.I recommend this book to anyone who wants to know about how the German High Command developed its strategy in the middle portion of World War I.

Excellent book; very detailed; superb research.