Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) Reprint Edition

Misreading of David Stahel's ThesisBy H. B. TaylorFirst I give Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East 5 stars. It is extremely well researched, albeit from primary sources that are only German. In addition a nice touch is that he adds a human element by quoting fragments of diaries and letters from various German soldiers and officers during the opening months of the war. These actually document the problems faced at the front by the Germans in contrast to the propaganda issued by Goebbels and his ilk.However the purpose of my review is to not add another 5 star review supporting the previous ones, but rather to counter misinterpretations in my opinion of David Stahel's thesis concerning Operation Barbarossa which appear in the many of the reviews of his book Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East.David Stahel's thesis is that after August 1941 it was apparent (or should have been to the German general staff) that the grand strategy of winning the war by eliminating the Russian army as a fighting force before the winter and before they could slip away into the interior was not going to work. Not only were the Russians not eliminated as a fighting force, but also they were not forced to flee into the interior. This failure of the strategic goal of Operation Barbarossa should have then, in the minds of the OKH, called into question whether the war was winnable at all.Some reviewers seem to think that to prove his thesis David Stahel is promoting the view that the Russian army defeated the German army in this initial period of the war up till the winter of 1941. These reviewers then counter Stahel's supposed view by citing the "tremendous" victories of Minsk, Smolensk, Uman, and Kiev among others. Their argument totally misses the point. Without providing details of Russian incompetent leadership, it is clear from reading the book that on a tactical level the German leadership was superior to the Russian leadership. But Stahel is not saying otherwise. What he is saying regarding these victories consists of two points. One point is that these tremendous victories cost the Germans a lot in terms of fallen soldiers, especially officers, and lost material, thus blunting the original offensive capability of Operation Barbarossa. This was due to the fact that Germany did not have the resources to make up for these losses. The second point regarding these victories that Stahel makes and these reviewers seem to ignore is that winning battles doesn't always result in winning wars (the United States won the Tet Offensive after all).Another of David Stale's major arguments, which he feels doomed Operation Barbarossa by the end of August 1941, was the - demonstrated by then - logistical incapacity of the German army when confronted with the atrocious Russian transportation network and the vastness of Russia. The Russian roads were totally inadequate, with dust choking and debilitating engines under the hot sun of July and August, and with rain showers choking those dusty roads with almost impassable mud from time to time. As far as the Russian railroad network was concerned, the absence of captured locomotives and rolling stock meant that it had to be rebuilt to accommodate the German railroad gauge, and there was not sufficient time to do it before the winter set in. To add to the inherent inadequacy of the Russian transportation network regarding the supplies of the German army was the sheer lack of carrying capacity of the existing number of available German and captured French trucks regarding the movement of supplies to the front lines over the vastness of Russia.Basically Stahel's thesis is that Operation Barbarossa's failure was apparent by the end of August 1941. It was due to the fact of the grinding down of the Wehrmacht's offensive capacity due to its battles with the Russian army, regardless of the fact that the Germans won those battles, and the inadequacy of the German logistical system.Now one might say that the failure of the strategic goal of Operation Barbarossa, namely the failure to defeat the Russian army as a fighting force by the beginning of the winter of 1941, does not necessarily imply that Germany was doomed to lose the war. David Stahel believes that it does, others do not. But Stahel does document the reasons that Operation Barbarossa failed in its strategic goal and he does plant in the reader's mind, based on the evidence he presents, the idea whether Germany had any possibility of winning the war at all regardless of future victories, in the face of the increasing industrial capacity of Russia and the ever increasing economic aid of the Allies. Suppose the Germans had taken Moscow, taken Stalingrad, and won at Kursk? Hitler was never convinced Moscow was the right strategic goal (although Halder did). Initially Hitler didn't care about Stalingrad. What would eliminating the Kursk salient achieve strategically, it would just have been another tactical victory.

This book, which is the first in a new series of academic studies on warfare and is edited by the highly acclaimed author and professor, Hew Strachan, is destined to become an instant classic. I must admit to the reader here at the beginning, that initially I purchased David Stahel's work simply because he referenced one of my studies in his bibliography (call it pride of authorship). However, once I actually read the work, I realized that it is a very well researched piece of scholarship. Having been published by Cambridge University Press, one does not expect anything less than stellar studies. This one is a gem.With great detail, Stahel weaves the fabric pattern of history that was Germany's 1941 summer campaign. Many times describing the seemingly insignificant details of the campaign, which make sense when one takes a step back and sees the entire tapestry of this titanic and cataclysmic event called the Russo-German War. The book is sure to appeal to both the most fastidious academic historian as well as the casual reader. Therein lies the secret to Stahel's successful study - that this book has been written in such a manner that it will appeal to a wider audience than academic studies usually do.His thesis - that Germany lost the war in 1941 during the summer campaign in central Russia, especially in August 1941 during the battle for Smolensk. No other author of late has made such a bold statement. To date I can only think of Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzers East" - although his thesis (to me anyway) appeared to be flawed. Given the magnitude of Stahel's work, it's not surprising that he keeps his description strictly on the events which occurred in the region of Heeresgruppe Mitte.Stahel does not merely rehash old material like a dime store WWII author. An example would be the following: everyone knows that Hitler reduced the TO&E strength of each panzer division immediately after the fall of France, from an average of 300 armored vehicles to 150 in order to double the size of his panzer divisions. However, no one up till now has actually described the losses which each panzer division incurred and the terribly deficient low percentage of strengths that Hitler's armored strike force possessed before, during, and after the Battle for Smolensk.Another reviewer states that the pros and cons of the Red Army were not included in the author's calculations, but Stahel actually does go into some detail about armor. His study of the performance of the new tanks being received in the summer of 1941, in addition to detailed descriptions of how many Red Army units resisted bitterly, costing the Germans time and troops - the two "T's" which they did not have in sufficient abundance for such a campaign, is explosive and ground-breaking.The study of the Red Army which, up until now, would have received a perfunctory "D" or "F" performance for its summer 1941 campaigning season, is turned on its head. On the contrary, with irrefutable evidence, Stahel describes how the Red Army fought far better than has been depicted. An example is the amount of detail and attention that he pays to the newly arriving armored vehicles of the Red Army. Although few in number and having teething problems like lack of sufficient crew training or organization, he describes the huge impact that the medium T-34c and heavy KV-1 tanks had on the Wehrmacht.I could go on "ad infinitum," but I digress....This study is a great addition to anyone's WWII library and especially their Eastern Front library. Panzer enthusiasts may not like the fact that Germany's doom in the east may have been sealed just two months and a week into the campaign, but there will certainly be enough material for argument and discourse from this ground-breaking study for years to come. Buy it!